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This report highlights and explores five questions that arose from the workshop on mind and 
attention in Indian philosophy at Harvard University, September 21st to 22nd, 2013: 
1. How does the understanding of attention in Indian philosophy bear on contemporary western 
debates? 
2. How can we train our attention, and what are the benefits of doing so? 
3. Can meditation give us moral knowledge? 
4. What can Indian philosophy tell us about how we perceive the world? 
5. Are there cross-cultural philosophical themes? 
 
1. How does the understanding of attention in Indian philosophy bear on contemporary 
western debates?   
 
In contemporary western analytic philosophy, it is assumed that attention involves 
selection, while the nature and function of that selection remain matters of controversy. How 
might Indian conceptions of attention bear on these debates? 
At the workshop, Alex Watson compared the Brahminical and Buddhist views of 
attention. On both views, attention is sufficient for consciousness. According to the former, 
however, awareness outstrips attention, while according to the latter attention just is awareness. 
The Brahminical view posits a distinct organ of attention, the manas, directed by the self. 
According to the Buddhist view, however, there is no self and no manas; rather, consciousness is 
exhausted by momentary, attended experiences. Watson raised three main problems for the 
manas view. First, not all attention is voluntary. Second and relatedly, as in daydreaming, 
attention is often captured without the subject even seeming to realize it. As emphasized by Jeorg 
Tuske in his presentation, however, insofar as Buddhism involves the instructed direction of 
one’s mental states, it may seem that some voluntary direction of attention is not only allowed, 
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but required. Third and finally, Watson alleges that there is a more fundamental problem in the 
self-manas model: the self requires antecedent awareness to direct the manas. Against the 
Buddhist view, on the other hand, Sebastian Watzl emphasized non-illusory experiences of 
controlling the focus of one’s attention that are irreducible to one experience event causing 
another. The Brahminical view that awareness outstrips attention, however, remains unsupported 
if in these cases one is attending to oneself as a director of attention.  
Whether we can ever have an experience of ourselves “as of a thing or substance that 
does something” as alleged by Watzl, can be questioned in any case. A related worry was raised 
by Declan Smithies commenting on Catherine Prueitt’s exposition of Abhinavagupta.  
On Abhinavagupta’s view, structured, conscious experience results from the effect of the 
apoha process on attention. The apoha process is a recursive process of exclusion, triggered by 
vasanas (previously stored mental imprints), which have in turn been triggered by subjective 
factors (e.g., goals and desires). The structure of the experience resulting from this process is 
held to be such that we always consciously attend to subjects and objects together. On this view 
then, attention is not only necessary for the emergence of the integrated perception of objects, as 
on contemporary integration theories of attention, but always also results in the experience of 
oneself as an experiencing perceiver.  
Here enters Smithies’ raised worry: in some, perhaps all, cases, we don’t seem to be 
aware of a subject. Our attention can be engrossed in things in the world to the exclusion of 
ourselves. As Hume pointed out, we seem unable to turn our attention in on ourselves at all, and 
as Gilbert Harman has emphasized, when I turn my attention to my experiences, I find only the 
world presented there, and not the presumed subject of the experiences. Even if our subjectivity 
comes into being by having these structured experiences, as Prueitt offered in reply, it does not 
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follow that we thereby attend to ourselves as emergent subjects when having structured 
experiences.  
The preceding discussions assume, like contemporary western views, that attention is a 
phenomenon of selection, but Kranti Saran argued that cases of meditative attention establish 
that conscious attention (at least) is only loosely connected to selection. Saran argues that there 
are cases of meditative attention during insight meditation wherein one is conscious without 
selectively attending to anything. Notice that the sufficiency of attention for consciousness must 
here be simply assumed if this is to be a case of not only consciousness without selection, but 
attention without selection. To encourage the subjugation of this claim to scientific scrutiny, 
Evan Thompson distinguished in his commentary between two distinct attentional phenomena: 
focused attention and open monitoring. As was repeatedly raised in discussion, however, it is not 
clear whether the non-selective phenomenon of interest to Saran is one of attention at all.   
Saran’s depiction of non-selective consciousness through insight meditation bears 
interesting resemblance to the construal of calm meditation offered by Laura Guerrero following 
Dharmarkirti. She construed the practice as a fixing of one’s attention on increasingly rarified 
objects until eventually consciousness of any object drops out altogether. On this view, however, 
not only attended, selected objects fall out, but consciousness as well. Here we do not seem to 
have (conscious) attention without selection. As with Prueitt’s Abhinavagupta then, in 
Guerrero’s understanding of calm meditation: to cease to selectively attend is to lose not only the 
objects of conscious experience, but oneself as a conscious subject.  
The role of attention in Indian philosophy has many further connections with 
contemporary western analytic debates. Worth particular mention are those in ethics. As 
discussed by Keya Maitra, the moral exemplar of the yogi, as depicted in the Bhagavad Gita,
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may be best characterized by the manner and content of the yogi’s “non-attached” attention. As 
pressed by Nico Silins in his commentary, however, evaluating this proposal requires getting 
clearer on the distinction between attached and non-attached attention. Similarly, Jake Davis 
appealed to the Buddhist notion of mindful attention as a means of objective, ethical knowledge 
that can be defended from moral relativism. As Sharon Street pressed in her commentary, 
however, evaluating this proposal requires further specification of a type of attention whose 
exercise is capable of yielding ethical knowledge. 
 
2. How can we train our attention, and what are the benefits of doing so? 
When thinking about how we can train our attention, the initial question to address is this: 
What determines what the mind attends to? At the workshop, Alex Watson’s paper compared 
two prominent classical Indian theories of attention in response to this question. 
● According to one picture (espoused by the Brahminical thinkers, especially by the 
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers), there is an internal sense organ, manas or the mind, 
which has two functions. In the case of ordinary sense-perception, it serves as a go-
between that connects the self with the sense organ: once the self is connected to the 
mind, the mind to the sense organ and the sense to the object, awareness of the object can 
arise and the self can attend to the relevant object. In the case of introspection, it behaves 
as an internal sense by which the self can attend to its own cognitive states. In each case, 
the self, by controlling the mind, controls what it attends to. Watson raises two problems 
for this view. First, it makes attention voluntary; but not all attention is voluntary. 
Secondly, the self needs to already have awareness of what objects the mind could 
possibly attend to, in order to make decisions about how to direct the mind. But, ex 
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hypothesi, such awareness could not arise unless one were to have directed attention to 
those objects.  
● According to the other picture (endorsed by the Buddhist), there need not exist any self in 
order for attention to be possible. The mental life of an agent consists merely of a 
sequence of discrete awareness-events, each of which involve attention. The problem for 
this view is to explain (i) cases in which an agent attending to an area in anticipation of 
the object that will arrive there, (ii) cases in which an agent seems to choose what it 
attends to, and (iii) the cases in which several objects compete for attention and the need 
for resolving this conflict arises. A large part of Watson’s paper was devoted to the 
Buddhist replies to these worries. In response, Sebastian Watzl asked how the Buddhist 
would explain the datum that the phenomenology of attention typically involves 
experiences of oneself controlling the focus of attention. Watson’s reply was that these 
are just brute facts about the particular agent’s mental life.  
 
After determining what the mind attends to, our next step toward answering how we can 
train our attention is to ask: What kind of top-down influences is attention open to? David 
Nowakowski’s paper nicely illustrated how the range of objects that we can attend to is restricted 
by our previous awareness-episodes. This discussion focuses on a debate between the Buddhists 
and the Nyāya philosopher Udayana about the momentariness of objects.  
● The Buddhists seek to prove the momentariness of various middle-sized objects by 
appealing to a universal premise, namely that everything existent is momentary. Against 
this, Udayana points out that, in order to establish this universal premise, the Buddhist 
must not only show that some existents are momentary, but also show that no non-
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momentary object is existent. In order to do this, it must be possible to cognitively attend 
to non-existent objects. For the Buddhist, this is possible, because we cognitively attend 
to a cognitive object (ākāra), which in the veridical case just is an inner replica of the 
mind-independent object to which it refers. In the non-veridical case, the cognitive object 
refers to what does not exist (asatkhyāti). Thus, a non-veridical awareness event is 
sufficient to allow the mind to cognitively attend to a non-existent object. 
● In order to refute this view, Udayana claims that one’s cognition can stand in a relation to 
a determinable object only if its causal history involves epistemic processes like veridical 
perception, veridical inference, etc., which link it to that object. Now, in the case of non-
veridical cognition including the so-called “cognition of non-existents,” the object 
appears in a manner that is “other than what it is” (anyathākhyāti); for example, when a 
horned hare appears in cognition, the hare appears as characterized by a feature that in 
fact is absent from the hare. This phenomenon also received some discussion in Nilanjan 
Das’s paper, “Cognitive Penetrability in Nyaya.” According to this view, in order to 
cognize a particular or a property in a locus from which it is actually absent, we must 
have cognized that feature before by means of some veridical epistemic process (what 
Udayana calls an “epistemic instrument”) and are now recollecting the object of that 
previous cognition. So, we never cognitively attend to a non-existent like a horned hare, 
but only ascribe a previously cognized existent feature, e.g., a pair of horns, to an existent 
object before us, e.g., the hare. Thus, according to this view, what we have learned 
through epistemic processes in the past limits the range of objects that we can cognitively 
attend to now. 
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 We are now in a position to answer our original question: How can meditation train 
attention? In his paper, Kranti Saran presented a response to this question. Saran examined three 
claims:     
A1: Attending to something is always at the expense of attending to something else. 
A2: The phenomenology of attention is structured into foreground and background. 
A3: Suppose attention were radically dissociated from selection. Then one person in the NSA 
could snoop in on everything. And that’s absurd. Call this “Snoop’s World.” 
 
 Saran’s goal is to resist A1 and A2 and yet not end up in “Snoop’s World.” His claim is 
that conscious attention is neither conceptually nor structurally tied to selection within 
consciousness.  If this is true, some prominent theories of attention are mistaken  (e.g. Smithies 
(2011), and Watzl  (2011)). Moreover, if selection within consciousness is a necessary 
consequence of a capacity limitation, and there are   experiences in which there is no selection, 
then there are experiences, which are not capacity-limited.   
 Saran argues that the deployment of attention in insight meditation is an example of an 
experience that defies A1 and A2, without incurring snoop problems. Here’s how it goes. At the 
first stage, one focuses on the inflow and outflow of your breath, and makes the area that one is 
focusing on smaller and smaller. At the second stage, one is aware of lots of sensations in one’s 
body that one ordinarily ignores. At the third stage, one sweeps attention serially over (and 
through) parts of the body while observing the sensations present there. At this stage of the 
meditation, there are no “dark” areas, and one can feel high-resolution sensations “flowing” over 
and in all parts of the body. Instead of scanning one’s body part by part, one can take in the full 
three-dimensional array of bodily sensations and bodily boundaries in one take.  If Saran were 
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right, it would provide one kind of answer to our original question. Meditation trains attention to 
be unselective.  
 
One final and related question is this: What are the practical and or moral benefits of 
meditative training? In the workshop, we encountered two perspectives on this question. 
1. The Brahminical Perspective. In the Bhagavad Gita, the yogin is presented as a 
practically ideal agent who is even-minded in success and failure. In her talk, Keya 
Maitra argued that this practical ideal is tightly connected to the way in which, through 
continuous meditation, the yogin directs his attention in a non-clingy way toward the 
world. However, as Nico Silins pointed out, the relevant questions are these: How is 
clingy attention different from non-clingy attention? Is clingy attention merely diffuse 
attention, or is it characterized by a lack of control? Is this property of clinginess or non-
clinginess sufficient to distinguish the manner of the yogin’s attention from that of the 
non-yogin, or do we need to ascribe to the yogin a different manner of attention 
altogether? In response, Maitra argued that both the manner and content of the yogin’s 
attention were different. 
2. The Buddhist Perspective. Within the Buddhist tradition, meditation is often taken as a 
means of training attention. In his talk, Jake Davis argued that training attention through 
Mindfulness Meditation can lead to moral expertise. By attending to external and internal 
stimuli more carefully, subjects become experts at knowing which motives contribute to 
ease, and which contribute to unease. This, according to the Buddhist, is tantamount to 
moral expertise. So, the standard of ethical judgment, for the Buddhist, is the agent who 
is wide awake and attends to all the external and internal stimuli. However, as Sharon 
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Street pointed in her comments, the question is: What makes this expertise moral, rather 
than merely instrumental? It is not obvious that the causal regularities between 
motivation and ease or unease ground morality. 
 
3. Can meditation give us moral knowledge? 
 
 In the workshop, Jake Davis argued for a moral epistemology grounded in the early 
Buddhist dialogues of the Pāli Nikāyas. The Buddha denies that faith or reason give us access to 
moral facts. What else is left? Contemporary western answers include moral intuition, moral 
perception, emotions, etc. Davis adds another answer: mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna,) cultivated 
through meditation.  
 Davis argues that mindfulness meditation modifies our attentional and/or memory 
processes (Davis and Thompson, 2013, develop these arguments at length). Expert meditators 
are alert to stimuli that would ordinarily elude consciousness. For instance, subjects who 
completed a three-month meditation retreat had a reduced “attentional blink” (Slagter et al., 
2007). The attentional blink occurs when two targets are presented in rapid succession. 
Presumably because the first target occupies attentional resources, subjects are unaware of the 
second. Mindfulness also attenuates affective biases within attention and memory. One study on 
memory showed that subjects could recall positively valenced words better following twelve-
week meditation training. Prior to (but not after) training, the subjects in question were best able 
to recall negative words, followed by neutral, and finally positive ones (Roberts-Wolfe et al., 
2012).  
 Davis argues that mindfulness plays a role in moral epistemology on the following 
grounds. Lack of alertness and affective biases result in ordinary individuals being unreliable 
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judges of what motivations (e.g. good will, friendliness, hatred, or greed) bring about ease and 
unease. Mindfulness therefore puts one in a better epistemic position to discover what 
motivations cause ease and unease. To avoid relativism, Davis claims that morality must be 
based in an ethical project all humans share, and all humans share the basic ethical project of 
avoiding unease. Thus, mindfulness puts one in a better epistemic position to discover which 
motivations are (ethically) good and which are (ethically) bad to have. Given this, we should 
either become meditators ourselves or treat the community of mindfulness meditators as moral 
experts.  
 Many philosophers will reject Davis’ thesis that people share an ethical project of 
avoiding unease. In her commentary, Sharon Street worried that Davis allows only for 
enlightened self-interest, not genuine morality. For Davis, motivations like friendliness and greed 
are good or bad only insofar as they further the self-interested goal of living with ease. Relatedly, 
Street asks whether we would still defer to mindfulness meditators if they converged on the 
conclusion that hatefulness and greed lead to more ease than other motivations. Doing so would 
seem to give us the wrong moral theory. So even if we should defer to mindfulness meditators on 
authorities about what reduces unease, we should not ipso facto defer to them as moral 
authorities.  
 In a question to Davis, Susanna Siegel objected that unease can be ethically good. For 
example, anger feels good in some contexts and is politically necessary. Yet even righteous 
anger often leads to unease. Righteous anger creates two potential problems for Davis. We can 
tease these problems apart using D’Arms and Jacobson’s (2000) distinction between two ways 
that emotions can be appropriate. First, having an emotion can make one better (or worse) off in 
some way. Emotions can be expedient, spur you to action, or reduce unease. Insofar as righteous 
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anger spurs you (or your peers) into action, it can make you better off (this was Siegel’s point). 
And sometimes, the benefits of action outweigh the costs of unease. Second, emotions can fit (or 
fail to fit) their objects. Arguably, anger is fitting if and only if you are angry at something unjust  
(e.g. political corruption or betrayal). Someone who responds to betrayal with (genuine) 
friendliness may live a life of greater ease. Yet her emotional responses to betrayal are arguably 
unfitting; the unjust deserve our anger. One could therefore argue that we ought to feel unease in 
ethical situations where unease is fitting. 
 Davis makes a first-order normative commitment—reducing unease is always good—that 
many philosophers will also reject. Can we divorce Davis’ moral epistemology from this 
commitment? Perhaps one would judge all sorts of moral questions more reliably if one were 
more alert and less biased. For example, affective biases may lead one to ignore evidence that 
one’s friend has committed a crime or to misclassify the pliers in a black man’s hand as a gun. If 
Davis’ moral epistemology is dissociable from his first-order normative commitments, 
mindfulness could add to any ethicist’s epistemic toolkit, regardless of how normative ethics 
turns out. Arguably, Davis would still have made a significant discovery about moral 
epistemology (and perhaps epistemology more generally). Davis would have discovered a new 
epistemic tool (distinct from reason, intuition, emotions, etc.) that it is within our power to 
improve (through meditation).  
 However, there is room to resist the claim that Davis’ moral epistemology and normative 
commitments are separable. It will be useful to draw an analogy with Keya Maitra’s talk on 
yogic attention in the Bhagavad Gita. In a response to Nico Silins’ commentary, Maitra argued 
that the manner and object of yogic attention are interdependent. The yogi attends to the 
conscious self (as opposed to external objects) in a non-attached manner. And the yogi cannot 
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attend in this manner to anything but the self (perhaps because one becomes attached to any 
external object she thinks about). So the success of yogic practices depends on how, and so what, 
one attends to. 
 Similarly, perhaps the success of mindfulness meditation depends on your first order 
normative commitments (a reply first suggested by Sean Smith). Consider an example to 
illustrate this claim. Courtney believes that she ought to maximize cognitive and/or affective 
stimulation (even if this brings tremendous unease). Courtney may lack (and believe she ought to 
lack) the requisite mental discipline and/or motivation to become an expert meditator. For 
instance, she may believe that sitting silently for eight hours a day over twelve days is a 
tremendous waste of affective and cognitive stimulation (and therefore not worthwhile). So 
individuals with certain normative commitments might be unable or unwilling to become 
mindful because of those commitments.  
Davis may therefore have good reason not to divorce his moral epistemology and 
normative theory. But this could create further problems for his epistemology. For example, if 
the success of meditation depends on normative commitments, then there may be a type of 
normative selection bias in mindfulness meditators. People who become expert meditators will 
tend to share certain antecedent normative views. Thus, expert meditators may converge in their 
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4. What can Indian philosophy tell us about how we perceive the world? 
          How do we come to have conceptualized experiences of the world? According to 
Dharmakiriti, an influential 7th Century Buddhist Philosopher, we arrive at such experiences 
through the transformation in perception from svalakasanas—non-conceptual qualitative 
particulars—to samanyalaksanas—conceptualized “type-tokens” that occupy our ordinary 
perceptual experiences. The question is: How does such a transformation take place?  
          In her paper, Laura Guerrero explains Dharmakiriti’s answer to this question. She points 
out that Dharmakiriti’s distinction between svalakasanas and samanyalaksanas seems analogous 
to Jerry Fodor’s distinction between iconic and discursive representations. A discursive 
representation has a correct decomposition, such as a sentence, whereas an iconic representation, 
such as a mental image, does not. Svalakasanas are akin to iconic representations in that they 
both do not involve conceptual cognition, and samanyalaksanas are akin to discursive 
representations in that they both involve conceptual cognition. Therefore, Guerrero thinks that 
the question at issue can also be formulated as: How does the transformation from iconic 
representations to discursive representations take place?    
          According to Guerrero, Dharmakiriti takes the process of transformation to break down 
into two steps. In the first step, iconic representations together with some subjective factors— 
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which include aversions, desires, affects, and interests that constitute the agents’ “engaged 
situation at the time of cognition”—trigger vasana, which are subconscious mental imprints that 
encode information from past experiences. In the second step, vasana facilitate a recursive 
process of exclusion called apoha, in which the vasana kick out irrelevant differences of things 
that are in fact radically individuals and focus on their functional features that are relevant to our 
interests in order to create similarities among those things. With the created similarities, our 
perceptual system then judges those things as belonging to the same type.  
          For example, when you see a fire, your iconic representation of it and some subjective 
factors such as your practical interests in this particular situation trigger the encoded information 
about fires from your past experiences. Next, your current experience is compared with your past 
experiences to create functional similarities among the fire you see now and other fires you saw 
in the past, which allow your perceptual system to judge them as the same type of individuals.  
          In his comments on Guerrero’s presentation, Alex Byrne pointed out that the distinction 
between iconic and discursive representations seem irrelevant because iconic representations are 
no more “nominalist friendly” than discursive representations. As Guerrero said, svalakasanas 
cannot be conceptualized because this involves properties and according to Buddhism, there are 
no properties at all. However, if we compare mental image of a cow, which is an iconic 
representation, and a sentence “There is a white cow with green horns,” which is a discursive 
representation, we find the picture taking as much of a stand on what properties the cow has as 
the sentence. This suggests that iconic representations are no more suited to capture 
svalakasanas.  
          Some related issues in Indian philosophy are the cognitive penetrability of perception and 
its epistemological implications. In his paper, Nilanjan Das focused on the Nyāya school’s 
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theory on these issues. He argues that Naiyayika (the adherents of the school) take it as possible 
that our cognitive states can influence our perceptual experiences. One example is the 
sandalwood case, in which the subject believes that sandalwood is fragrant, and this causes him 
to experience a piece of sandalwood (far away from him) as fragrant. Das thinks that adopting 
the cognitive penetrability thesis allows Naiyayika to explain cases of illusion and hallucination, 
which seem to pose a problem to the principle of perceptual contact accepted by Naiyayika: 
“Any entity that forms a part of the content of a perceptual state (in a human being) must be 
causally linked to some sense or other.” In the sandalwood case, the subject’s memory of the 
fragrance forms a causal link between his present perceptual experience and the fragrance; 
similarly, in cases of illusion and hallucination, the subjects’ cognitive memory-based states 
form a causal link between their present perceptual experiences and the relevant properties, 
objects, or facts.  
          Das points out that the same approach can be used to explain some cases of recognition in 
which properties encountered at an earlier time are now ascribed to some individuals. So, some 
(but not all) instances of recognition also count as instances of cognitive penetration. However, 
there seems to be an epistemic difference between cases of recognition and epistemically bad 
cases of cognitive penetration (e.g., in a case of hallucination): whereas the subjects in 
recognition cases have reason to endorse the contents of their experiences, they lack such reason 
in epistemically bad cases of cognitive penetration. Here Naiyayika faces another problem: 
When do cognitively penetrated experiences provide us with reason for believing their contents?  
          To answer this question, Das appeals to a parallel between cognitive penetration and 
theoretical decision-making. Cognitive penetration, as Das sees it, involves a transition between 
two experiences—the initial non-penetrated experience and the resultant cognitively penetrated 
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experience. A subject has reason to believe the contents of the resulting experience just in case 
the subject is reasonable in making a transition from the initial experience to the resulting 
experience in the “decisional counterpart” of that experience. In particular, Das proposes the 
following three necessary conditions: the new epistemic reason condition, which says that the 
subject must have reason to believe the contents of the initial experience; the reliable starting-
point condition, which says that the subject must have reason to believe that their penetrating 
cognitive states are reliable; and, the percolation condition: that the subject’s initial experience 
jointly suffices with the penetrating state to supports the resulting experience. 
          In Susanna Siegel’s comments on Das’ presentation, she asked why Das appeals to the 
decisional counterpart strategy since they are obviously different. In reply, Das argued that the 
etiology of cognitive penetration can be rationally assessed in a similar way that the etiology of a 
decision procedure can. That is why he compares the two. In the Q&A section, Imogen Dickie 
also pointed out that Das’s internalist decisional counterpart strategy appears to be in tension 
with Nyāya’s externalist Perceptual Contact principle since it requires that the subject have some 
reason to believe the contents of the initial experience. In reply, Das argued that the requirement 
is not incompatible with externalism since reasoning from unsupported evidence is an unreliable 
method.  
 
5. Are there cross-cultural philosophical themes? 
 
 Do philosophical themes transcend cultural boundaries, even without communication 
between cultures? In his commentary on David Nowakowski’s talk, Farid Masrour argued that 
some papers at the workshop, including Nowakowski’s paper on Udayana, provides evidence 
that there are some cross-cultural themes in philosophy, which occur at distinct locations in spite 
of the very different cultural contexts in which they have been embedded. However, a critic of 
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this idea might point out that there is a tendency to misconstrue the ideas from other cultures, 
including those from Indian philosophy. In such a case, the apparent similarity between ideas 
would be artificial. So, the argument goes, we need to avoid importing our own ideas onto Indian 
philosophy.  
In his commentary, Masrour pointed to three issues that are commonplace in western 
philosophy debates and implicit in the framework in which Udayana is working. First, there is a 
well-developed epistemology, in particular, a sophisticated theory of inference. There is also a 
well-developed account of perception that sounds like a direct realist account of perception. 
Thirdly, there is an account of the origin of cognition that sounds like an empiricist view. In 
short, it seems like Udayana and his interlocutors took various positions in logical space on 
issues and topics that have been important for philosophers of a different tradition that did not 
seem to have any communication with these people. This gives some support for the idea that 
there are some cross-cultural topics and themes in philosophy that occurred at distinct locations 
in spite of the very different cultural contexts in which they have been embedded. Because of 
this, Masrour argued, contemporary work on Indian philosophy can offer a significant 
contribution to philosophy, in that it can provide evidence for the existence of trans-cultural 
philosophical themes.  
 A critic might highlight the following, however. Consider the difference between the 
projects of examining what Ancient Western Philosophy had to say about issues surrounding 
direct realism, as opposed to the project of examining what Indian philosophy has to say about 
those issues. With the Ancients, despite the temporal divide, arguably there is a tradition 
connecting them to us. With Indian philosophy, however, the case for a unifying tradition is 
much harder to make. Given this, there might be a special danger of importing our own ideas 
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onto Indian philosophy. In the case of the Ancients, while there is still a danger, there is reason 
to believe that our contemporary ideas might be similar to theirs: our contemporary western 
philosophy arose out of theirs. With the case of Indian philosophy, there is no such reason.  
 We are sympathetic with the idea that there are cross-cultural philosophical themes. But 
even if this is not the case, there are alternative ways to develop a dialogue between Indian 
philosophical traditions and contemporary western philosophy. We have thus far discussed 
workshop presenters (including Nowakowski) who used contemporary ideas to interpret ancient 
Indian philosophy. In contrast, presenters like Kranti Saran and Jake Davis, and Evan Thompson 
in his commentary, used examples and theories from ancient Indian philosophy to engage with 
contemporary western debates.  
 In his reply to Saran’s talk, for instance, Thompson advocated for a new kind of cognitive 
science to bring Indian philosophy to bear on modern western debates. He argued that Indian 
meditative and philosophical traditions offer hypotheses, such as Saran’s claim that there can be 
attention without selection. Such claims, however, need to be conceptually, phenomenologically, 
and experimentally disentangled. And that takes a certain kind of cognitive science, which he 
called “Cross-cultural Contemplative Cognitive Science.” 
 In his response, Saran added that he thinks there are several ways to engage with the 
Indian Philosophical tradition. One is by engaging philologically; that is, through a method that 
is grounded in texts. A second way is Thompson’s way: using experiments to naturalize claims 
made in Indian philosophy. A third way, Saran suggested, is by just treating the ideas as 
philosophy, without worrying about textual fidelity or about how the ideas can be tested 
empirically. Saran argued that we should not see the ideas of Indian philosophy as unpalatable, 
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but rather as authentic ideas from a tradition, ideas that have their own internal justification and 
logic. We should take the ideas seriously as philosophy, he argued, and engage with them.  
 
 
